John Seiver Hotel Fire 1989 - Johnson City, TN - Famous Fires on Waymarking.com

Those who lost their life:
Juanita Ward 76
Fred Kidd 66
Ivan Atwood 68
Carmen Baughan 79
Lori Carlisle 78
Brian Cozad 29
Ethel Francis 76
William Carl Ogburne 51
Cleo Range 89
Doris Riening 72
Emma Shade 85
Josephine Eager 82
Blanche Shell 83
Ethel Shelton 80
Lora Shook 88
Carolyn Somitch 31


The following is from the US Fire Administration investigation of the fire:

A Christmas Eve fire that caused the death of 14 residents and two visitors occurred at the John Sevier Center, a high-rise residence for the elderly, in Johnson City, Tennessee. It also injured about 50 other people including 15 firefighters. One victim was found in the elevator lobby on the sixth floor, one in Room 107, and the rest, 14 victims, on higher level floors in living units.

The fire started in Apt. #102 shortly after 1700 hours and traveled out of the apartment and across the ceiling above the main hallway smoke detectors (which would have activated the 911 fire alarm system) across to the main lobby. Swirling smoke trapped many of the occupants on the upper floors of the 11-story building before any notification or alarm was heard by them.

The alarm was received at 1711 by the dispatcher of the Johnson City Fire Department. The first units were on the scene within four minutes. Upon arrival, flames were observed on the first floor and additional calls were made for backup units to respond. More than five hours later,firefighters were still breaking windows and heavy smoke continued to hamper their rescue efforts. Johnson City firefighters, public safety officers, and hundreds of volunteer firefighters and civilians who had responded to the call assisted in the rescue and treatment of the injured. Almost every available emergency unit and crew from as far as 70 miles away answered the call. Helicopters from as far away as Virginia helped to move the injured from the fire scene to nearby hospitals. Sub-freezing temperatures hampered rescue efforts and made some of the occupants resistant to leaving the building. The freezing conditions caused firefighters to have to force open exit doors. The building had a history of "false alarms," which may have caused some of the occupants not to be too concerned even if the alarm was heard.

Many of those who were able to make it out on their own in the early stages of the fire simply wandered off, or were treated and released by rescue workers. Others were assisted by their families and friends. Red Cross workers tried desperately to determine who and how many occupants were still left in the building.

The fire on December 24, 1989, was the second fatal fire to occur at the John Sevier Center within two months. A previous fire, which occurred on October 25th, 1989, caused the death of 76-year-old Joseph R. England. Fire officials attributed the cause of that fire to the accidental filling of a kerosene can with gasoline by friends of the deceased which was later used to fill a kerosene heater. The occupant died three days later from the effects of smoke inhalation. Even though this fire prompted the Johnson City Commission to issue directions for all buildings in the downtown area to be inspected within two years, the John Sevier Center had only been inspected by building officials for repairs necessitated by the fire, because of time constraints.

The Johnson City Fire Marshal's office had investigated the fire which occurred on October 25, 1989. A final inspection of Apt #513 was also conducted during the week of November 27. Another inspection of smoke towers and standpipes was also conducted because of reports that heavier than usual accumulations of smoke had traveled to the upper floors at the time of the fire. This heavy smoke accumulation was later attributed to a break in the pipe chase between floors, thereby allowing the smoke to travel freely to the upper floors of the building. Fire officials had attempted to correct the situation by working with building officials and engineers to convince the owner of the seriousness of this situation and bring the building into compliance.

Primary concerns with the building involved vertical penetrations, allowing smoke to travel upward between floors, the capacity and proper functioning of ventilation to remove and segregate smoke, and also the lack of sprinkler systems, even though the building did contain a standpipe system which met code requirements at the time it was renovated in the late 1970s. At the time of the fire the John Sevier Center housed approximately 145 residents. Exactly how many were actually in the building when the fire occurred has not been determined. Several of the residents who were thought to be missing were later accounted for.

The fire was brought under control shortly after arrival, and fire damage was limited to the floors. Smoke continued to fill the building,requiring ventilation and rescue operations to continue for at least another five hours. More than 200 paid and volunteer firefighters responded along with public safety officers, EMT's, and rescue workers from over 70 miles away to help combat the greatest tragedy Johnson City has ever experienced. Hundreds of others brought food and clothing for victims and rescue workers. Many acts of heroism were reported. Fire and police personnel responded as planned and volunteer units provided the additional manpower and equipment so vitally needed at the scene and also to cover fire stations providing fire protection for the other areas of the city.

Sub-zero temperatures impaired the refilling of air bottles at the scene, because the pump on the portable unit was frozen. Other fire departments readily provided the many air cylinders needed as well as other equipment. According to Chief Buckles , each department seemed to know in advance where to position their equipment to the greatest advantage, and every member of that department went about his business in a professional manner, without adding confusion to such a major operation.

Media reports state that "Johnson City's fire and police departments responded with the sort of efficiency we have come to expect."FIRE CAUSE AND DELAYED REPORT While the cause of the fire had not been determined at the time of this report, it is generally believed there were several minutes between the time the fire originated and the time it was reported via the 911 alarm system. It is apparent where the fire occurred, however, and based on this knowledge,investigators believe the fire ignited a loveseat in the immediate area of origin in Apt. #102 and then traveled in a vertical path until reaching a dropped ceiling supported by wooden joists. The fire quickly traveled across the ceiling, gaining in intensity as it consumed combustible materials above the dropped ceiling. Only after the flames had progressed out of Apt. #102 and into an open lobby area was there sufficient smoke coming down from above the ceiling tiles to cause the automatic hall smoke alarms to activate.
THE STRUCTURE
According to building officials the building was approximately 65 years old. It was originally a high-rise hotel that had been converted to a "residential high-rise" in the late 1970s. At the time of conversion and renovation the building was periodically inspected to insure compliance with the building codes in effect at that time. The last time a major inspection was conducted by building officials was in 1980. Periodic fire inspections of public areas were conducted, with thelast one (prior to the October 1989 fire) done in January 1989. While city officials recognize that the building would not meet today's building and fire codes,they were quick to point out that the Center met all of the city codes in effect in 1980. However, because of the October fire and because of concerns it raised about smoke travel and reports of floors and walls being breached, fire officials were in the process of updating the building to meet present day codes. Sprinkler systems were planned and provisions were being discussed with owners and engineers to see if anything could be done to limit occupancy only to ambulatory residents, particularly on the upper floors.Fire escapes were provided in the west and south wings, along the middle, and at the mezzanine level. Smoke fans were also provided in the west and south wing exits which leads directly to the street level. A center stairwell which was part of the old hotel was not marked as an exit, nor did it exit to the street. It apparently was to be used only by maintenance personnel and not the residents of the building.
SMOKE DETECTORS
Local smoke detectors were located in the bedrooms of each apartment and were monitored in the manager's office. Hallway smoke detectors were strategically located throughout the Center and activated a 911 system both in the building and at the Fire Department dispatcher's office. Notification and early warning was delayed because of the rapid spread of smoke above the ceiling level and the fact that the bedroom door in Apt. #102 was closed during the fire. This fact prevented either alarm to function as it was designed to function and allowed the fire and smoke to enter above the detectors into the main lobby. Eventually detectors were activated, as were several others. If heat detectors had been above the ceiling level, this might have provided earlier alarm and the additional time necessary to alert occupants.
ESCAPE ROUTES
Even though several of the occupants had already exited the building prior to the arrival of the Fire Department, many others hesitated to venture out into the sub-freezing temperatures. This caused a back-up of people trying to descend the stairways and may have caused some to believe the exit doors would not open even though they were equipped with panic bars. Reports indicate the firefighters may have had to force open these doors to gain access to the building and complete evacuations. Some of the occupants may have even returned to their apartments to await rescuers rather then to attempt to find another exit.
HUMAN BEHAVIOR
While thick smoke filtered up through elevator shafts and pipe chases,
residents using crutches, walkers, and canes attempted to exit through
narrow stairways from as high up as the tenth floor. Others, too frightened, too old, or too confused simply stayed in their apartments and waited for the rescue teams to arrive. Not all were fortunate enough to be found, however, before they succumbed to the deadly gases. Reportedly, one couple, found dead, had been sitting in their chairs reading the Bible. Because of the frequency of seemingly minor fires or false smoke alarms, some residents may have simply ignored the alarm. Others, because of poor hearing, may not have even heard the alarm. This situation may have added to the already confused atmosphere that seemed to prevail, as many residents left their apartments to go into a hallway already filled with smoke. Fire resistant doors had been installed at the entrance of each apartment. However, the automatic door closers were removed in many of them due to resident complaints the doors were too hard to open.
THE FIRE DEPARTMENT
The Johnson City Fire Department provides protection to a fast growing community with a current population of 48,000 people in a 29 square mile area. The Department operates under the guidelines established by the Tennessee Commission of Firefighting, the TFIRS fire reporting system, the NFPA, and the Johnson City Civil Service Commission. The Insurance Service Office (ISO) has rated it as a class three department. The 74-person department responds from five fire stations and is augmented by 100 public safety officers who have been cross-trained in fire fighting activities. From January through September 1989, there had been 712 fire calls had been answered, 669 fire prevention inspections, 27 plan reviews, 273 code enforcement investigations, and 42 fire investigations resulting in six arrests for arson. Prior to the fire in Johnson Sevier Center, two fire prevention programs had been started. The Learn Not To Burn Curriculum was begun in the city's public schools and the "Juvenile iresetters" program was developed through the Watauga Mental Health Center. Because of limited staff limitations and time constraints, other planned projects had not been implemented.

CODE COMPLIANCE/VIOLATIONS
Presumably the John Sevier Center met code requirements at the time it was renovated as a "high-rise residential" property in 1980. There is no question, however, that a properly installed sprinkler system could have prevented the rapid spread of fire on the first two floors. Nor is there any question that heavy smoke traveled rapidly up elevator shafts and pipe chases causing most of the victims to die of smoke inhalation, even though the fire was contained to the first two floors. Questions remain in the minds of some residents, family members, building owners, elected and appointed city officials as to whether or not the building was properly classified at the time it was renovated and if it were properly inspected by building and fire officials before, during, and after completion of the renovation process. While many documents provided by code enforcement authorities to attest to the fact the building had been inspected during this phase of the changeover, questions still prevail as to how thorough these inspections were and on how closely the existing codes were compiled with. Were building permits obtained for all interior constructions since renovation? Even as late as the previous fatal fire in October 1989 code violations were observed yet left uncorrected because time and the inspectors workload did not permit more thorough preliminary inspections or more frequent follow-up inspection. The October fire had simlar consequences due to rising smoke in the pipe chase areas. Even though a person died, the fire was not deemed to be "important enough" to have a sprinkler system installed at the time. The owners and managers of the building have said they planned to install a sprinkler system in the building in the Spring of 1990. Yet, large holes were left open between floors where smoke passed freely to the floors above.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE
While hundreds of people gathered food and clothing for victims and rescue workers to help fend off the below freezing temperatures, nearby hotels offered free rooms for the survivors and their families. The American Red Cross had declared the Center a national emergency, thereby providing additional funds for the local chapter to help residents find housing and provide health care and other necessities. Of those residents not staying with friends or relatives, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and city officials provided temporary shelter and assistance in relocating them to permanent quarters.

Type of Structure: Public building Construction Date: 06/07/1924 Fire Date: 12/24/1989 Structure status: Still standing building Cause of Fire: Investigators believe the fire ignited a loveseat in the immediate area of origin in Apt. #102 and then traveled in a vertical path until reaching a dropped ceiling supported by wooden joists. The fire quickly traveled across the ceiling, gaining in intensity as it consumed combustible materials above the dropped ceiling. Documentation of the fire: [Web Link] Other: Not listed

Visit Instructions:
Give a narrative of your experience. Did you learn anything after reading about the fire in the waymark? Photos are always welcome too. Please no virtual visits.

Recent Visits/Logs:

Date Logged Log User Rating   03/14/2009 Countrydragon visited it 11/30/2008 PersonsMD visited it

View all visits/logs